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if the mitigation options were legally
proper, the trial court's conclusion that
Avco possessed a duty to mitigate its
damages against the Kilcreases consti-
tuted an unreasonable prerequisite to
Avco's right to sue Ramsey for his
faulty title opinion.
Additionally, the supreme court ex-
plained that the three mitigation options
offered by the trial court were incom-
plete, risky, time-consuming, and ex-
pensive. The court concluded that "(t)he
law of mitigation does not impose upon
the damaged party the duty to expend
good money to chase the bad; nor does
it impose upon the damaged party the
duty to first exhaust all other remedies."
Accordingly, the Alabama Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, finding in favor of Avco.
-Judith Gorske
Uninsured motorist
coverage notice
held satisfactory
In Breithaupt v. USAA Property and
Casualty Ins. Co., 867 P.2d 402 (Nev.
1994), the Supreme Court of Nevada
held that USAA Property and Casualty
Insurance Company (USAA) provided
customers with satisfactory written no-
tice regarding the availability of unin-
sured motorist coverage. In so doing,
the court refused to overrule legal pre-
cedent imposing a greater duty of notice
on the insurer. The court also declined
to apply retroactive disclosure laws upon
insurers because such measures would
not improve consumer awareness of the
benefits of purchasing optional unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage.
The Notice Requirement
On April 4,1988, BarbaraBreithaupt
suffered severe and permanent injuries
in an automobile accident. While she
recovered the maximum amount from
the other driver's insurance company,
this amount did not fully compensate
for her injuries. Breithaupt carried un-
insured/underinsured motorist (UM)
coverage with USAA in the amount of
$15,000 per person and $30,000 per
accident for both of her vehicles. She
also carried bodily injury coverage of
$300,000 per person and $500,000 per
accident. In order to provide Briethaupt
with maximum coverage, USAA al-
lowed her to stack the UM coverage on
her two vehicles and paid her $30,000,
the full amount of her UM coverage.
Breithaupt filed suit against USAA
under a Nevada statute, NRS
687B.145(2), seeking reformation of
her automobile insurance contract. She
alleged that USAA failed to comply
with pre-1990 statutory language re-
quiring the insurer to notify its custom-
ers that they could purchase UM cover-
age equal to the limits of bodily injury
coverage. In dispute was USAA's in-
surance renewal notice that included a
flyer describing both the nature of UM
coverage and the minimum coverage
which an uninsured motorist was re-
quired to purchase by law. The flyer
contained a section entitled: "Higher
limits are available." The higher limits
section discussed factors that an insured
should consider in determining the ap-
propriate amount of coverage to pur-
chase. The notice also stated:
"If you want to increase your UM
coverage, give us your order on the
order form on the back of this folder.
Available limits are listed in the box to
the right.
"IMPORTANT: The UM policy lim-
its you select may not exceed the Bodily
Injury (BI) liability limits in your policy.
If you want to increase your UM to a
limit higher than your present BI, please
use the order form on the back to in-
crease your BI liability limit."
To the right of this statement, USAA
listed "UM Limits Available." The list
included UM coverage of $300,000 and
$500,000.
Breithaupt contended that the insur-
ance renewal notice failed to satisfy the
notification requirement under the Ne-
vada statute because it was unclear and
ambiguous. She claimed that as a result
of these deficiencies, the court should
reform her contract with USAA to al-
low the UM limits of the policy to equal
the limits for bodily injury. Under a
reformed contract, USAA would pro-
vide Breithaupt with UM coverage of
$300,000 per person for each of her two
vehicles. Stacking this coverage would
entitle Breithaupt to $600,000 of UM
coverage, allowing her to recover an
additional $570,000 for damages sus-
tained in her accident.
The trial court granted summary judg-
ment for USAA, holding that the con-
tract should not be reformed because
the written notice satisfied the state law
requirements. Breithaupt then appealed
to the Nevada Supreme Court.
Court Finds Full Disclosure of UM
Coverage
The Supreme Court of Nevada re-
jected Breithaupt's contention that the
insurance renewal notice was unclear,
ambiguous, and did not satisfy statutory
requirements. It agreed that USAA could
have made a clearer affirmative state-
ment to Breithaupt that UM coverage
equaling her bodily injury coverage was
available. However, the court found that
the notice was sufficient to inform "the
average layman who is untrained in the
law or the field of insurance" that UM
coverage equal to bodily injury cover-
age was available.
In addressing the issue of notifica-
tion, the court examined the language of
the pre-1990 version of the applicable
state law. In relevant part, the statute
provided that insurers "must offer unin-
sured motorist coverage equal to the
limits of bodily injury coverage sold to
the individual policyholder." The court
acknowledged that "must offer" was
susceptible to a variety of interpreta-
tions, each imposing a different duty of
notice upon the insurer. In its discus-
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sion, the court relied upon its analysis in
Quinlin v. Mid Century Ins., 741 P.2d
822 (1987), and the state legislature's
use of "offer" in other insurance stat-
utes. It concluded that "offer" was used
to instruct insurance companies simply
to make a certain type of coverage avail-
able to purchasers. Nevertheless, the
court stated that in order to effectuate
the legislature's intent, the insurers must
notify their customers that greater UM
coverage is available. The Quinlin court
held that the following statement in-
cluded in the insurer's renewal notice
satisfied the statutory notification re-
quirements: "Did you know that you
may now have uninsured motorist cov-
erage in amounts up to your bodily
injury liability limits? If interested con-
tact your agent." In examining the noti-
fication in the case at bar, the supreme
court held that USAA made a much
fuller disclosure of the UM coverage
available to insureds, and thus met the
notice requirement under the statute.
The court concluded, however, that
the 1990 amendment to the applicable
state law rendered Quinlin's notice stan-
dard inapplicable to insurance transac-
tions that occurred after the effective
date of the statute. The legislative his-
tory behind the amendment indicated
that it was specifically intended to im-
pose prospectively a greater duty of
notice upon insurers.
Court refuses to impose retroactively
a broader standard of disclosure
Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme
Court rejected Breithaupt's argument
that Quinlin should be overruled and a
broader duty of disclosure retroactively
imposed. It concluded that the legisla-
tive history behind the applicable state
law indicated the legislature's intent
was to impose a greater duty of disclo-
sure upon insurers only to insurance
transactions made after the effective
date of the statute.
The court examined the committee
meetings and legislative history behind
the 1990 amendment to NRS
687B. 145(2). In doing so, it concluded
that the legislature had not considered
the statute as imposing a duty of notice
greater than announced in Quinlin. The
court failed to identify any legislative
evidence that Quinlin contravened the
intent of the 1979 legislature in enact-
ing NRS 687B. 145(2). Furthermore, it
reasoned that even if Quinlin had been
wrongly decided, it was not necessary
to impose retroactively a greater burden
upon insurers. In making this determi-
nation, the court articulated three fac-
tors limiting the law to prospective ap-
plication. These included: (1) the deci-
sion must dictate a new legal principle
which either overrules past precedent
on which parties may have relied or is
an issue of first impression, the outcome
of which was not clearly foreshadowed;
(2) the court must evaluate the merits in
each case by examining the prior his-
tory, purpose, and effect of the rule
under analysis and whether or not retro-
spective operation will aid its imple-
mentation; and (3) the court must con-
sider whether retroactive application
could cause substantial inequitable re-
sults. The supreme court concluded that
the retroactive application of NRS
687B.145(2) would not improve pre-
1990 consumer awareness of the ben-
efits of purchasing the optional UM
coverage. Accordingly, it affirmed the
lower court's grant of summary judg-
ment for the insurer, USAA.
-Benjamin Malkin
Strict liability
extended to
commercial leases
In Samuel Friedland Family Enter-
prises v.Amoroso, 630 So.2d 1067 (Fla.
1994), the Florida Supreme Court held
that the doctrine of strict liability ex-
tends to commercial lease transactions
of defective products.
The Amorosos hit rough seas
The Diplomat Hotel (Diplomat), a
waterfront property in Hollywood,
Florida, leased part of its land to Sunrise
Water Sports, Inc. (Sunrise) which used
the land to operate a sailboat rental
stand. Sunrise owned the sailboats, but
Atlantic Sailing Center, Inc. (Atlantic),
rented them out. The Amorosos were
guests at the Diplomat and rented sail-
boats on three separate occasions. Dur-
ing the third rental, the crossbar on the
Amorosos' rented sailboat broke and
Mrs. Amoroso was injured. As a result
of her injuries, Amoroso and her hus-
band sued the Diplomat, Sunrise, At-
lantic, and the welder who had repaired
the crossbar a few days before the acci-
dent. One of the Amorosos' claims as-
serted that the Diplomat, Sunrise, and
Atlantic were strictly liable for Mrs.
Amoroso's injuries.
The trial court directed verdicts in
favor of all the defendants on the strict
liability claim. The district court of ap-
peals reversed the trial court, holding
that strict liability extends to commer-
cial lease transactions. The appellate
court certified the question of whether
the doctrine of strict liability extends to
commercial lease transactions for ap-
peal to the Florida Supreme Court.
Lessors in the leasing business held
to strict liability
The Florida Supreme Court initially
analyzed the purpose of strict liability.
The court stated that the doctrine of
strict liability causes the entities within
the distributive chain who profit from
the product's sale or distribution to bear
the burden of product defects, even un-
detectable ones. As compared with an
innocent injured person, those entities
are in a better position to ensure the
safety of products, protect against de-
fects in those products, and spread the
cost of any resulting injuries. The Florida
Supreme Court had previously adopted
the strict liability doctrine in West v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co, 336 So.2d 80,
87 (Fla. 1976), and recognized that "a
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